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PARTISANS & PARTISAN COMMISSIONS
Keith S. Brown and Adam Candeub*
By statute, commissioners of both the Republican and Democratic par-
ties serve on partisan independent agencies, such as the Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("FCC") or Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC"), but the majority of commissioners and the commission chairs
must belong to the president's party.' These partisan requirements have
spawned a myriad of constitutional and administrative law debates concern-
ing the constitutionality and/or desirability of requiring the president to
appoint agency heads belonging to the opposing party' and, more generally,
permitting agencies to be independent of direct executive control?
* Keith S. Brown is an economist at the Center for Naval Analyses, based in Alexandria, Virgin-
ia. Adam Candeub is an associate professor at Michigan State University College of Law, East Lansing,
Michigan. The authors thank for their insights and suggestions Steven Croley, Josh Fischman, Eric
Posner, and other commentators on this Essay at the annual meeting of the American Law and Econom-
ics Society held last May at Columbia Law School in New York City. We also thank John M. de Figuei-
redo, George Krause, and Steve Wildman for their excellent reviews and insights. We thank Barbara
Bean and Scott Nagele for their data wizardry, as well as the several Michigan State University law
students who helped on data entry. We also thank Mae Kuykcndall, Glen Staszewksi, Barbara Bean, and
our other colleagues for their helpful insights.
1 Neither the United States Constitution nor federal statutes define what an independent agency
is. The term instead refers to the varying limits placed on the president's power to appoint and remove
agency heads. See infra note 20. By most counts, there are six major independent agencies with partisan
requirements: the Federal Communications Commission, 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5) (2006), the Federal
Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006), the Securities and Exchange Commission, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78d(a) (2006), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b) (2006), the Federal
Election Commission, 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (2006), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5841(a)(1) (2006).
2 Scholars have examined a variety of mechanisms of control and influence over the administra-
tive state but have concentrated on political and partisan control. See Todd T. Kunioka & Gary M.
Woller, Bank Supervision and the Limits of Political Influence over Bureaucracy, 59 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
303, 303-04 (1999); Evan J. Ringquist, Political Control and Policy Impact in EPA's Office of Water
Quality, 39 AM. J. POL. Sci. 336, 336 (1995). Compare Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureau-
cratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 780 (1983) (examining congressional control of the FTC), with Terry M.
Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 197 (1982)
(examining the presidential impact on independent agencies), Susan K. Snyder & Barry R. Weingast,
The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB, 16 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 269, 271 (2000) (arguing that the Senate and the president influence agency appointments), and
Steven D. Stchr, Top Bureaucrats and the Distribution of Influence in Reagan 's Executive Branch, 57
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 75, 76-77 (1997) (presenting survey data that indicate that bureaucrats respond to
presidential and congressional, and special interest influence). Economists and public choice theorists
have identified numerous ways bureaucrats act to extract rents, such as maximizing their discretionary
budgets. See William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 618-23 (1975)
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These debates have existed largely without empirical data showing
how or whether party affiliation affects independent agency decisionmak-
ing. Using a vast dataset of every FCC final order over a twenty-eight-year
period, this Essay finds that the FCC, the federal independent agency with
the greatest output of orders and other administrative promulgations, is not
obviously partisan-meaning that party affiliation does not drive voting to
the degree one might expect.4 Most decisions are unanimous. Certain com-
missioners, however, have a much greater tendency to dissent, and this
commissioner-specific tendency, more than party affiliation, drives dissent.
In other words, even when two commissioners are in the same party, com-
missioners vary greatly in their tendency to dissent. If partisanship domi-
nated voting, one would expect lockstep voting. Instead, it appears as if
"non-partisan interests" or "idiosyncrasies" drive a commissioner's voting.
These interests could range from his or her future career ambitions in indus-
try, a desire to placate a constituency important to a particular congressional
ally or sponsor, personal ideological fervor, or even an individual propensi-
ty towards contrariness.'
The process of selecting commissioners and the administrative struc-
tures in which they interact affect partisanship. First, the changing practices
the Senate employs in confirming commissioners, such as only considering
a nominee if a nominee of the opposite party is also considered at the same
time, has increased partisanship. Second, the institutional structure in which
commissioners operate-a five or seven person commission-can explain
variation in partisanship. Our results supplement recent claims that parti-
sanship increased after the Reagan revolution.6 Our results show a decrease
in partisanship during the early years of Reagan's tenure, but also an in-
(examining bureaucrats' incentives to maximize their discretionary budgets). Many scholars have ex-
amined how opportunism and transaction costs affect regulators' behavior and their relationship to the
legislative and executive branches. See John D. Huber & Charles R. Shipan, The Costs of Control:
Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 25, 25-26 (2000); Mathew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 243-46 (1987); B. Dan Wood & James E. Anderson, The Politics of
U.S. Antitrust Regulation, 37 AM. J. POL. SCi. 1, 1-2 (1993) (connecting political influences to FTC
decisionmaking); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 801, 801-02 (1991) (identifying events such as appointments,
resignations, and budget appropriations, and showing a bureaucratic response to them).
3 See infra notes 9-11.
4 This question has never been examined before. For instance, Ho only examines partisan drivers.
Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan Requirements on Regu-
lation (Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper, Feb. 12, 2007), available at http://dho.stanford.edu/research/
partisan.pdf.
5 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
DO IT 72-89 (1989) (explaining agency capture).
6 Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the
Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459,479-91 (2008).
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crease during the later 1980s and 1990s.7 We call for increased scholarly
attention to these "micro-institutional features."
These findings bear upon the constitutional theory of separation of
powers and administrative law. Independent agencies' constitutional status
continues to be controversial,8 with debates typically pitting the unitarians
against the anti-unitarians. The former argue that the president enjoys unita-
ry executive power over the entire bureaucracy and thus challenge both the
wisdom and constitutionality of independent agencies.9 The latter argue that
limits on presidential power are legitimate. 0
7 This may be somewhat ironic since the move from seven to five commissioners was a purely
partisan political move against a few Democratic commissioners. See DENNIS W. MAZZOCCO,
NETWORKS OF POWER: CORPORATE TV's THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 162 (1994) (attributing the decrease
in the number of commissioners to "political squabbling between the Reagan administration and Se-
nate").
8 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 324, 356-57 (2006) ("A vast literature exists debating whether Article 11's Vesting Clause requires
a 'hierarchical, unified executive department under the direct control of the President,' or whether the
Clause permits a looser hierarchy in which some exercises of executive power can be placed beyond the
President's direct control." (footnote omitted)); Stephen G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for
the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 27-28 (1995) ("It is therefore a bit surprising that the last
thirty years in this country have seen the emergence of what may prove to be an enduring (and angry)
debate over the proper scope and extent of presidential power. The issue seems to be whether 'Our
President' has come to have too much power over the last 200 years or perhaps too little!" (footnote
omitted)); William N. Eskridge, Jr., America's Statutory "Constitution", 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 11
(2007) ("Scholars heatedly disagree as to whether such [independent] agencies and such lawmaking or
adjudicatory authority are un-Constitutional ....").
9 See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV.
1035, 1068 (2007) ("[S]omcone who favors the idea that the Constitution enshrines a unitary executive
and who regards conventional delegations as generally constitutional might argue that conventional
delegations made to nonexecutive branch entities are unconstitutional."); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin
H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153,
1165-68 (1992) ("The practical consequence [of the modem unitary] theory is dramatic: it renders
unconstitutional independent agencies and counsels to the extent that they exercise discretionary execu-
tive power." (footnote omitted)); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 567 (1994) ("[W]e think it is highly unlikely that the Framers
intended to permit Congress to conjure up an independent administrative branch of government ....");
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2001) ("1 argue that a statu-
tory delegation to an executive agency official-although not to an independent agency head-usually
should be read as allowing the President to assert directive authority, as Clinton did, over the exercise of
the delegated discretion."); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
L.J. 969, 978 n.44 (1992) ("Chevron's democratic theory thesis appears to presuppose a unitary execu-
tive, i.e., an interpretation of separation of powers that would place all entities engaged in the execution
of the law-including the so-called independent regulatory agencies-under presidential control.");
Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 51-52; Glen 0. Robinson, Indepen-
dent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 246 ("Of course,
agency members are subject to a host of influences, including expected future rewards, from sources
other than the White House. Nevertheless, despite recurrent suggestions that independent agency mem-
bers are somehow specially vulnerable to such 'outside' influences, there is no evidence that susceptibil-
ity to exogenous pressures or influences is a function of bureaucratic form." (footnote omitted)); Paul R.
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Unitarians argue against independent agencies because they see them
as highly partisan tools of congressional aggrandizement which sap energy
from the executive and diminish democratic accountability. Anti-
unitarians tend to see independence as enabling professionalized bureau-
cratic decisionmaking and/or furthering valuable deliberative democratic
goals.12
Commissioners' idiosyncratic agenda can drive voting more than par-
tisanship, an important point the current agency independence debate
misses. If party-affiliated voting is a proxy for congressional or presidential
control, our data suggest that chairs' and commissioners' responsiveness to
this control varies significantly.
Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779, 781 ("The
critical guaranty of independence.., is the statutory protection that commissioners enjoy against presi-
dential removal; typically, they can be removed only 'for cause.').
10 Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 227, 227 (1998) ("[Tlhe emergence of the new presidentialism, as a dominant theme in
administrative and structural constitutional law, is, at least potentially, a profoundly anti-regulatory
phenomenon."); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centra-
lized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 835-36
(1996) (arguing that the unitary executive decreases presidential power because it prevents the president
from deflecting responsibility); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administra-
tion, 94 COLUM. L. REV 1, 2-4 (1994); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administra-
tive State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 965-66 (2001) ("Although proponents of a
,unitary executive' theory claim that the president's constitutional role as chief executive should give
him unqualified executive power, ... policy considerations raised by this issue leads to a contrary con-
clusion." (footnote omitted)); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A
Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 597 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agen-
cies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578-81
(1984); Verkuil, supra note 9, at 792-94.
11 Frank H. Easterbrook, Unitary Executive Interpretation: A Comment, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
313, 318-19 (1993) (contending that members of Congress and independent agencies-which are more
beholden to committee and subcommittee chairmen-are both "farther from the median of national
opinion than are presidents"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power
to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 333-35 (1994) (arguing that the unitary executive approach to
Chevron, which would entitle the president's interpretation of laws to the greatest deference, is the
better interpretation).
12 See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations ofAdministrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 171
(2006) ("In contrast to pure executive agencies, independent agencies that stand apart from partisan
politics and set the ground rules for the political branches' exercise of political power serve as process-
reinforcing or pluralism-reinforcing referees rather than reflexive servants of the president's majorita-
rian will."); Cynthia R. Farina, The "Chief Executive" and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 179 (1997) (describing the dangers and developments of presidentialism, or the
"cult of the Chief Executive"); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Law-
making, 61 U. CtI. L. REV. 123, 124 (1994) (arguing that we must accept some congressional efforts at
regulating presidential lawmaking); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence
on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1994) (arguing that the president should not
micro-manage agency policy decisions but rather use a "big picture approach" to influence agency
policy more effectively).
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Given this insight, the unitarians are probably mistaken in suggesting
that independent agencies necessarily result in the opposing party undercut-
ting presidential authority. The anti-unitarians are also probably mistaken
when arguing that agency deliberations will necessarily result in delibera-
tive decisionmaking insulated from the political fray.13 Rather, commission-
ers respond varyingly to agenda and purposes, suggesting that both presi-
dential and congressional control, to the degree they exist, vary greatly.
This control is not a necessary feature of agency independence but a feature
of persons and personalities who wield power.
This Essay first explains the logistic model that we use to show how
idiosyncratic concerns drive commissioner voting, often to a greater degree
than party affiliation. Second, we examine the confirmation and nomination
process for commissioners and find that the institutional structure can ex-
plain much of the variation in commissioner partisanship. Third, we ex-
amine how these results lead to questions about many of the assumptions
implicit in the fierce controversies in constitutional and administrative law
concerning independent agencies.
I. THE FCC: AN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH PROGRAM
The FCC produces the greatest number of orders and dissents of all the
independent agencies, 4 thus offering an excellent opportunity to examine
voting behavior and its motivations. Charged with setting national commu-
nications policy, 5 its members receive five-year presidential appointments,
subject to Senate confirmation. 6 From its inception in 1934 until 1983, the
FCC had seven commissioners, and since 1986 it has had five. 7 By statute,
the majority of the commissioners must belong to the party of the president;
the remainder must belong to the other major party. 18 The commissioners
vote on all major administrative actions, such as reports and orders, notices
of proposed rulemakings, notice of inquiries, informational reports, notices
13 See Calabresi, supra note 8, at 83-84 (criticizing independent agencies for "not only a risk of
industry or interest group capture" but also for capture by "geographic congressional committee inter-
ests"); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial and Imperiled: The Curious State of the Executive, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1021, 1056 (2008) ("Finally, Congress typically requires that agencies be com-
posed of some members of the opposition party, thus increasing the chance that some members will
have preferences that vary from the appointing President's presumed preferences." (citing DAVID E.
LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 3-4 (2003))).
14 Ho, supra note 4, at 11.
15 47 U.S.C. § 155(a) (2006).
16 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
17 id.
18 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5) (2006).
2010]
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of liability and other enforcement actions, and license transfer approvals,
which often relate to media or telecommunications firm mergers. 9
Agency "independence," a concept without a definitive constitutional
or statutory meaning, generally refers to the standards under which an
agency head may be removed (or selected).2" Unlike heads of executive
agencies, such as Defense, Health and Human Services, State, Interior, etc.,
who are "at pleasure" employees who may be removed for any reason at
any time and may belong to any political party, independent agency heads
may generally only be removed "for cause" or some other standard that
Congress sets forth in statute, and independent commissions often have
partisan membership requirements.2 ' There is no statutory provision for the
removal of FCC commissioners.22 However, the president may remove the
chair at will, "demoting" him or her to commissioner, although that has
only occurred in recent history when a new president assumes office.23
We employ a unique data set comprised of over 8,000 orders and deci-
sions, which includes every vote on an FCC final order from the period of
1977-2003.24 For each vote, we observe how the chair voted, how each
commissioner voted, the chair's party affiliation, each commissioner's party
affiliation, and whether the issue was one of the highly-disputed cases that
'9 See47U.S.C. § 155(a).
20 There are numerous agencies with varying types of independence. See Neal Devins, Political
Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L.
REv. 273, 274 (1993). The "traditional independent agencies" are governed by bi-partisan commissions;
they arc typically identified as the "SEC, ICC, FCC, Federal Reserve Board, and NLRB." Miller, supra
note 9, at 51; see, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (setting forth conditions of FCC independence).
21 Verkuil, supra note 9, at 781 ("The critical guaranty of independence ... is the statutory protec-
tion that commissioners enjoy against presidential removal; typically, they can be removed only 'for
cause."').
22 See Elizabeth A. Snodgrass, Note, Foreign Affairs in the Twilight Zone: The Foreign Affairs
Powers of the Federal Communications Commission, 83 VA. L. REv. 207, 211 (1997) ("[T]hc Commu-
nications Act establishes five-year terms for the Commissioners and provides no other provision for
presidential removal, a formulation that eliminates the President's discretion to remove officials at will."
(footnote omitted)).
23 47 U.S.C. § 154(a).
24 We only included final orders and adjudications susceptible to court appeal and challenge. We
did not, therefore, include Notices of Proposed Rulemakings, reports, and other agency documents.
While vital to the administrative process, these documents do not constitute determinations of legal
fights. FCC orders were identified by searching Westlaw. Search results were compared for certain test
years with the Federal Communication Commission Record, the official publication of the FCC, with a
discrepancy of roughly I to 2 percent. Only final orders voted by the commissioner and subject to judi-
cial appeal were included in the database. Bureau-level orders, which are not subject to appeal, and non-
final items, like Notices of Proposed Rulemaking, not subject to appeal, were not included in the data-
base. The search string employed for each year in the study was: (order decision) +255 adopted +4 2003
+10 released & "by the commission" & DA (AFT 01/01/2003 & BEF 04/12/2003) & FCC +2 "03".
Slight variations were used in some years to account for changing formats of FCC orders.
[VOL. 17:3
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involved Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs").25 We treat the
chair's vote as an independent variable driving the votes of the other com-
missioners, which leaves us with a data set of 32,515 commissioner votes,
(i.e., the chair votes are treated on the other side of the regression).
The raw or descriptive statistics reveal an interesting story. As the fol-
lowing table illustrates, the overwhelming majority of agency decisions are
made unanimously. Most of the votes are affirm, whether they are cast by
commissioners of the chair's party ("majority affirm") or commissioners of
the party different from the chair ("minority affirm").
Minority Party Minority PartyPartial
Dissent 020_ Disent, 0 100.MiuorityPat Coniur,
400
MaMinorit Pally Afiuim,
Majaority Par), AflintP
48.0D1
1Ilaj oriq7P aif-,Concut,__ MaorMp j 3,
0.5% MajrityParityPaftial Dissent, 0,2N
Dissenlt, O. !
Figure 1. Voting Breakdown
FCC procedure explains why so many decisions are unanimous. The
chair controls the agenda by deciding which orders are voted on and setting
each meeting's agenda.26 Chairs will use their power to bring only those
orders to vote with which they agree so that control of the agenda works as
25 We include RBOCs as an independent variable because their issues tended to pit the interests of
large telecommunications firms like AT&T and MCI against equally large firms like Verizon and SBC.
These issues tended to be heavily lobbied, as evidenced by the leading position of the giant telecommu-
nications companies in amounts spent on lobbying and campaign contributions. RBOC decisions have
been found to receive different treatment from the FCC. See John M. de Figueiredo, Strategic Plaintiffs
and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 501, 518 (2005).
26 ERwtN G. KRASNOW ET AL., FCC LOBBYING: A HANDBOOK OF INSIDER TIPS AND PRACTICAL
ADVICE 90-91 (2001); 47 C.F.R. § 0.3 (1994).
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a sort of veto. Once a chair brings an order to vote, commissioners have
five options: affirm, concur, dissent in part, dissent in full, or not partici-
pate. These choices inform our statistical methods. We use a technique
called multinomial logistical regression to model them.
This statistical technique relates discrete choices (in this case, com-
missioners' votes to affirm, concur, dissent in part or dissent in full) to in-
dependent variables (in this case, the chair votes and whether he or she be-
longed to the same party as the commissioner), revealing whether there is a
statistically significant relationship between the independent variable and
the commissioner votes choices. Because the chair controls his agenda, his
votes are the independent variable that control or determine the commis-
sioner's choices.27 Of course, the chair generally agrees with himself, and,
therefore, almost always affirms, concurring, partial dissenting, or dissent-
ing only in a tiny handful of cases. Therefore, the important result for our
regression can be reduced to the question of how a commissioner votes
when (i) the chair affirms and belongs to the same party and (ii) the chair
affirms but belongs to a different party.
This relationship is expressed below:
Chair affirms and belongs to the Affirm
same party as the commissioner
Commissioner's Choices
Partial
Dssent
Chair affirms and belongs to the
different party than the commis- Dissent
sioner.
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
Figure 2.
27 To be more specific, we classify the commissioners according to whether or not they are in the
same party as the chair ("majority party") or in the other party (the "minority party"). The four possible
votes (affirm, concur, dissent in part, dissent) create eight possible values for commissioner votes:
majority-affirm, majority-concur, majority-dissent in part, majority-dissent in full, majority-affirm,
majority-concur, majority-dissent in part, majority-dissent in full. We do not treat the not participating
category because it is the smallest and, for statistical reasons, we must exclude one option as discussed
below.
[VOL. 17:3
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In some specifications, we include "dummy" variables for each com-
missioner as well as for chairs in order to measure the individual effect of
each commissioner (or chair) on voting decisions. Dummy variables omit
data related to one commissioner in the regressions in order to detect the
"individual" effect of that commissioner's votes, creating a metric for de-
termining the "idiosyncratic effects" of a particular commissioner.
II. RESULTS
We present our results in two steps. First, using multinomial probit lo-
gistic regressions, we show evidence of partisanship in FCC voting, reveal-
ing that party affiliation appears to be a driving factor in some FCC vot-
ing.28 Second, we use the results from the logistic regressions to infer condi-
tional probabilities.
These estimates show how a commissioner's membership (or not) in
the chair's party drives the probability that the commissioner will vote in a
particular way. Not surprisingly, when a commissioner belongs to the
chair's party, the commissioner is more likely to affirm and less likely to
dissent. We call this the "partisan gap" in voting.
Using dummy variables, we also compare the difference between the
likelihoods of dissent under individual chairs as well as the likelihoods that
individual commissioners will affirm or dissent. We call this the "idiosyn-
cratic gap" and it varies significantly among chairs and among commis-
sioners. Quite surprisingly, when comparing the "partisan gap" to the "idio-
syncratic gap" the idiosyncratic difference can dwarf the partisan differ-
ence.
28 We readily concede that multinomial logits use the independence of irrelevant alternatives
("IIA") assumptions, but many contend that the IIA assumption is not overly restrictive for most appli-
cations. See Jay K. Dow & James W. Endersby, Multinomial Probit and Multinomial Logit: A Compari-
son of Choice Models for Voting Research, 23 ELECTORAL STUD. 107, 107-13 (2004). Indeed, some
recent research suggests multinomial logits produce better estimations than multinomial probits, which
loosen the IIA restriction. See Jonathan Kropko, Choosing Between Multinomial Logit and Multinomial
Probit Models for Analysis of Unordered Choice Data 1 (Apr. 5, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, avail-
able at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p-mla apa research-citation/2/6/5/6/9/pages265696/p26569
6-I .php). Political scientists and public choice scholars have long used both multinomial logit and probit
modeling to examine voting behavior. See Dean Lacy & Barry C. Burden, The Vote-Stealing and Tur-
nout Effects of Ross Perot in the 1992 U.S. Presidential Election, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 233, 233-34
(1999); Normal Schofield et al., Multiparty Electoral Competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A
Model Based on Multinomial Probit, 97 PUB. CHOICE 257, 270 (1998).
2010]
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A. Evidence of Partisanship
The following tables summarize the results showing the significant ef-
fects of party affiliation on voting or what this essay terms "partisanship."
For simplicity, this table only reflects the relationship between (i) a chair's
decision to affirm and whether he is of the same party as the commissioner
and (ii) the commissioner's voting choice. We report results without and
then with dummy commissioner variables.
Commissioner Vote
Affirm Concur Partial Dissent
Chair's Party is Dissent
Same or Different Same Party
from Chair Affirm .82 0.03 1.70 -0.24
Commissioner's
Party/ Chair Different
Affirms Party Chair
Affirm 0.17 -0.23 2.01 0.05
Observations 32,515
Table 1. Determinants of Commissioner Choice; Multinomial Logit (Partial Results); 29
( significant at 10%; "" significant at 5%; -* significant at 1%)
29 Complete results may be found in the Appendix.
[VOL. 17:3
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Commissioner Vote
Affirm Concur Partial Dissent
Chair's Party is Dissent
Same or Different Same Party
fro m Chair Affirm .65"** -0.05 1.45 -0.34
Commissioner's
Party/ Chair Different
Affirms Party Chair
Affirm -0.01 -0.35 1.77 -0.07
Observations 32,515
Table 2. Determinants of Commissioner Choice. Multinomial Logit with Chair Dummies
(Partial Results) 30 ('** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%)
These results demonstrate the partisan component to FCC voting. In
both specifications, if the chair affirms and the chair is of the same party as
the commissioner, there is a statistically significant likelihood that the
commissioner will affirm. Conversely, if the chair affirms and the commis-
sioner is of a different party, there is a statistically significant and consis-
tent, but weaker, likelihood that the commissioner will partially dissent.
B. Partisan vs. Non-Partisan Drivers
The preceding results establish a statistically significant relationship
between the chair's party and commissioners' voting choices--consistent
with the theory that party affiliation causes or drives commissioner voting.
These results do not give a sense of the magnitude of these variables' ef-
fects. Logistic regressions, however, permit calculations of inferential prob-
abilities-percentages that show the likelihood of a commissioner's vote
choice, given certain variables. Using inferential probabilities and dummy
variables, we can calculate the degree to which the likelihoods of commis-
sioner vote choices (affirm, partial dissent, concur, dissent) change due to
different chairs ("chair effects" or "chair gap"). We can also calculate how
the likelihoods of commissioner vote choices change due to the commis-
sioner being of the same or different party as the chair ("partisan gap" or
"party affiliation effects"). By comparing these results we can see whether
different chairs or different party affiliation has a greater effect on commis-
sioner voting. We find the likelihood to affirm and dissent changes much
more in relationship to the chair than with party affiliation, suggesting that
varying chair preferences for unanimity predominate over partisan con-
cerns.
30 Complete results may be found in the Appendix.
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Similarly, we can calculate how the likelihoods of commissioner votes
choices (affirm, partial dissent, concur, dissent) change due to different
commissioners ("commissioner effects" or "commissioner gap"); we also
can calculate how likelihoods of commissioner vote choices change due to
the commissioner being of the same or different party as the chair ("partisan
effects" or "party affiliation effects"). We can also compare these results to
see whether different commissioners or different party affiliation has a
greater effect on the likelihood to affirm or dissent. We find the likelihood
to affirm and dissent changes much more with commissioner than with par-
ty affiliation, suggesting that varying commissioner preferences to affirm or
dissent predominate over party affiliation.
1. Chair Effects
This table compares the likelihoods of the various commissioner vote
choices (in non-RBOC cases) when the commissioner is of the same party
as the chair, the party as the chair, and under different commissioners, here
Reed Hundt and Michael Powell. Hundt is a member of the Democratic
Party and served as FCC Chair from 1993-1997. Powell is a member of the
Republican Party who served as FCC Chair from 2001-2005.
Chair Actions
Chair Chair
Affirms/Same Affirnms/Different
Party as Party as Partisan
Commissioner Commissioner Gap
Hundt (D)
Affirm 96.80% 94.40% 2.40%
Dissent 0.20% 0.500 -0.3%
Commissioner Votes Powell (R)
Affirm 95.80% 91.80% 4.00%
_Dissent 1.30° 3.300 -2%
Table 3. Inference from Multinomial Logit Results. No RBOC, Chair Dummies (Partial Re-
sults)31
When Hundt voted to affirm, a Democratic commissioner had an esti-
mated probability of 96.8% of voting to affirm and a 0.20% chance of vot-
ing to dissent. A Republican commissioner had a 94.4% chance of voting to
affirm and a 0.5% chance of dissenting. We calculate a "partisan effect,"
which is the difference between the likelihood that a Republican or Demo-
31 Complete results may be found in the Appendix.
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crat would vote a particular vote choice under Chairman Hundt. This "parti-
san effect" is 96.8% - 94.4% = 2.4% in voting to affirm and 0.5% - 0.2% =
0.3% in voting to dissent. In other words, Democrats were more likely to
affirm under Hundt, and Republicans more likely to dissent. This is not
surprising.
Under Powell, a Republican commissioner had an estimated probabili-
ty of 95.8% of voting to affirm and a 1.3% chance of voting to dissent when
Powell voted to affirm. A Democratic commissioner had a 91.8% chance of
voting to affirm and a 3.3% chance of voting to dissent when Powell voted
to affirm. Under Powell, the partisan effect is 95.8% - 91.8% = 4.0% in
voting to affirm when the chair affirms. The partisan effect in dissenting
when the chair affirms is 3.3% - 1.3% = 2.0%. Again, Republicans are
more likely to agree with a chair of their own party, and Democrats more
likely to dissent.
In addition to examining the differences in commissioners' likelihood
to affirm and dissent attributable to party affiliation, we can use the inferen-
tial probabilities to examine differences attributable to serving under differ-
ent chairs (the "chair gap"). In certain cases, the chair gap between Powell
and Hundt is larger than the partisan effect during their tenures.
Commissioners from the same party as the chairman were more likely
to dissent where the chairman voted to affirm during Powell's tenure as
compared to Hundt's tenure. We therefore calculate a "chairmen gap,"
which is the difference in vote probabilities across chairmen, holding con-
stant the commissioner's own majority or minority party status and the
chairman's vote. Across Hundt and Powell, the chair gap is 1.3% - 0.2% =
1.1% for majority-party commissioners voting to dissent when the chair
affirms. The chairmen gap is 3.3% - 0.5% = 2.8% for minority party com-
missioners voting to dissent when the chair affirms. Concerning the proba-
bility of commissioners voting to dissent when the chairman affirms, the
chair gap between Powell and Hundt is larger than the partisan gap within
both Hundt and Powell.
As discussed below, this finding suggests that chairs push highly vary-
ing partisan agenda-some inspire very partisan voting; others do not. This
effect is purely "personal" and has nothing to do with the structure of inde-
pendent agencies per se. People appear more important than agency struc-
ture.
2. Commissioner Effects
As shown above, individual chairs can strongly drive results, even in
the presence of statistically significant partisan drivers. In addition, individ-
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ual commissioners could drive results even in the presence of partisan vot-
ing. To examine this possibility, we employ four commissioners:3"
(1) Andrew C. Barrett, a Republican, was appointed in 1989 by the
first President Bush and served until 1996."3 A former commissioner on the
Illinois State Commerce Commission, Barrett entered public relations after
his term at the FCC.34
(2) Ervin Duggan, prior to service at the FCC, was a Washington Post
reporter and White House aide. Appointed by the first President Bush,
Duggan was a Democrat. After he completed his term at the FCC in 1994,
he served as president and CEO of the Public Broadcasting Service, a post
he held until 1999.3 ' Duggan has largely disappeared from the public eye,
but occasionally reviews books for Amazon.com.
(3) Prior to his appointment by President Clinton in 1997, Commis-
sioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, a Republican, was the Chief Economist
for the U.S. House Committee on Commerce. He worked for Economists
Incorporated between 1988 and 1995 and previously had served as a re-
search analyst for the Center for Naval Analyses. 36 He has written columns
for the New York Sun and is a partner in a small economic consulting firm
with his wife Diane Furchtgott-Roth, a noted think tank economist and pol-
icy wonk.37
(4) Benjamin Lawson Hooks was nominated as a member to the FCC
by President Richard M. Nixon in 1972, becoming the first African-
American appointed to the Commission.38 He served as a commissioner
until July 1977 and then became NAACP executive director. Hooks is cur-
rently serving as a distinguished adjunct professor in the History and Politi-
cal Science departments at the University of Memphis.39
32 We chose these commissioners because they all served both under chairs who were and chairs
who were not members of their party and, therefore, provide real data (as opposed to computer generat-
ed counterfactuals) for comparing "commissioner effects" to "partisan effects."
33 See Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 149 (1993); NNDB.com, Andrew C. Barrett, http://www.nndb.com/people/090/
000169580 (last visited July 20, 2008) [hereinafter NNDB.com: Barrett].
34 See NNDB.com: Barrett, supra note 33.
35 See CharlieRose.com, Ervin Duggan, http://www.eharlierose.com/guests/ervin-duggan (last
visited July 20, 2008).
36 Federal Communications Commission, Former FCC Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth:
Biography, http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/previous/furchtgott-roth/biography.html (last visited Jan.
6,2010).
37 Furchgott-Roth Economic Enterprises, About Us, http://www.furchtgott-roth.corr/aboutus.php
(last visited Jan. 6, 2010); The New York Sun, Harold Furchgott-Roth-Archive, http://www.nysun.
com/authors/Harold+Furehtgott-Roth (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
38 The Museum of Broadcast Communications, Benjamin Lawson Hooks, http://www.museum.tv/
eotvsection.php?entrycode=hooksbenjam (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
39 University of Memphis: University News, Library Displays Feature Life and Career of Dr.
Benjamin Hooks, http://www.memphis.edu/newsarchive/dec07/hooks.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
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To compare the effects on voting attributable to partisanship with
those attributable to individual commissioners, we examine the partisan gap
and the commissioner gap for voting to affirm and dissent. All four of the
commissioners we examine served under both Democratic and Republican
chairs. Observing their difference in likelihood to affirm and dissent under a
chair of the same party and of a different party gives us each commission-
er's "partisan gap." Observing the differences between commissioners in
the likelihood to affirm or dissent we can determine their idiosyncratic dif-
ferences in affirming and dissenting or their "commissioner gap."
Chair Action
Chair Affirms/ Chair Affirms/
Same Party as Different Party as Partisan
Commissioner Commissioner Gap
All
commissioners
95.80% 92.10% 3.70%
Commissioner Votes Barrett (R) 97.50% 96.80% 0.70%
"Affirm" Duggan (D) 97.60% 97.00% 0.60%
Furchtgott-Ro
th (R) 88.40% 82.70% 5.70%
Hooks (D) 79.00% 73.20% 5.80%
Table 4. Inference from Multinomial Logit Results. No Chair and no Commissioner Dum-
mies, Chair Dummies (No RBOCs, Partial Results) 40
As Table 4 shows, commissioners have wildly divergent tendencies to
affirm and dissent. Barrett and Duggan had the highest relative likelihood to
affirm, while Furchtgott-Roth and Hooks had the lowest. They also have
divergent partisan gaps, as the final column reveals. Moreover, the idiosyn-
cratic gap can be large. The difference between the likelihood that Furch-
tgott-Roth and Hooks would affirm when the chair votes to affirm is 82.7%
- 73.2% = 9.5%. This is approximately 2.5 times larger than the partisan
gap of 3.7% for all commissioners. The gap between Duggan and Hooks on
the probability of affirming when the chair affirms is 97.0% - 73.2% =
23.8%. This is approximately 6 times larger than the partisan gap of 3.7%.
Simply put, idiosyncratic commissioner effects can dwarf the effects of
party affiliation, which suggests that commissioners' own ambitions, de-
sires to placate particular constituencies, or peculiar political loyalties play
a dominating role in voting decisions.
40 Complete results may be found in the Appendix.
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III. PARTISANSHIP OVER TiME
Given that partisanship is so variable, it is possible to identify those
factors associated with increased or decreased partisanship. Consider the
graph below showing changes in likelihood to dissent and partial dissent
over time.
Dissents and Partial Dissents at the FCC
1976-2003
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Figure 2. Likelihood to Dissent and Partial Dissent Over Time. The y-axis represents the
percentages of all orders; the x-axis shows the years.
The graph above simply shows raw statistics on rates of dissent and
partial dissent. There are three distinct periods of voting in our data: 1976-
1985, 1986-1997, and 1997-2003. We can reasonably ignore the 1984-85
and the 1997-98 periods as anomalous because the 1984 Modified Final
Judgment that broke up the century-old AT&T monopoly 4' and the 1996
41 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,226-34 (D.D.C. 1982).
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Telecommunications Act 2 were the most controversial and important
events in United States telecommunications history to date. Even with these
anomalies, these identifiable three periods become even more pronounced.
The three periods correspond to dramatic changes in FCC institutional
structure and commissioner selection processes. As mentioned above, in
1984 the Commission moved from a seven-member to a five-member
body. 3 A larger Commission makes dissenting in groups more likely be-
cause coalitions are easier to build.
More instructive, however, is understanding why dissents increased so
dramatically after 1997. No doubt the highly polarizing Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 had something to do with this change, but we posit some-
thing more subtle. Starting in 1997, FCC commissioners were routinely
chosen by a highly partisan process. In the nomination and confirmation
process, the president and Senate leadership stopped choosing individuals
who were acceptable to both parties. Rather, the Democratic leadership
chose its seats and the Republican chose theirs.4 A Republican commis-
42 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
43 Act of Sept. 8, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, §501(b)(1), 96 Stat. 763.
44 There appears to be a period, starting in 1997, in which "package deals" became the norm. Paul
Kane, Deal at Hand on Nominees, ROLL CALL, June 20, 2002; Adelstein Confirmed, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA, Nov. 18, 2002, at I ("Jonathan Adelstein's long-pending nomination for a Democratic seat on
the Federal Communications Commission received Senate confirmation late Thursday as part of a
package deal that included dozens of nominees for federal appointments."); Daschle Pushes for His
Adviser to Be Chosen for Vacant FCC Seat, TEL. REP., Nov. 15, 2001 ("One observer, however, noted
that unlike previous years, when 'package deals' were worked out between the Senate and White House
on FCC nominees, Mr. Adelstein would have to go through the confirmation process alone."); Doug
Halonen, FCC's Ness, Furchtgott-Roth to Exit, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Feb. 5, 2001, at 2 ("Sources said
the FCC slots will be filled as part of a package deal, with Democrats having their say on candidates for
Democratic openings. Some sources speculated that the package could be announced within the next
couple of months."); Doug Halonen, Ness Closer to Confirmation; FCC Commissioner's Campaign
Nears End, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Mar. 27, 2000, at 4 ("Veteran lobbyists also said Ms. Ness's best hope
for confirmation now, assuming she wins committee confirmation, would be to get 'paired' with a
nominee who has strong GOP support for an important post elsewhere in the government and then be
approved by the full Senate as part of a bipartisan package deal."); Doug Halonen, The Hundt Resigna-
tion: Succession Race Already Under Way, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, June 2, 1997, at 47 ("Sources said the
White House, however, will insist that its candidate to succeed Mr. Hundt be part of a package ....");
Furchtgott-Roth Said to Lead Candidates for FCC Post, TEL. REP., Feb. 10, 1997 ("For months con-
gressional sources have maintained that since two Commission seats are open--one Republican and one
Democrat-any potential nominee likely would be part of a "package deal" with the White House.");
Barrett To Leave FCC, Pressler Asks Him To Stay, TELEVISION DIG., Mar. 18, 1996, at I ("Sources said
[the] Administration earlier this year tried to work [a] package deal with Senate Republican leadership.
Republicans would select Barrett or any other nominee of their choice in return for promise to allow
smooth confirmation of Democratic candidate, which wouldn't be Quello. Agreement couldn't be
worked out, sources said, in part because Quello has bipartisan support in both houses of Congress.").
Interestingly, at the very end of our dataset, the second Bush presidency seems to be changing that
norm. Norman Ornstein & Nicole Duran, The Games Bush Plays with Good Nominees Are Counterpro-
ductive, ROLL CALL, July 14, 2004 ("The president has the authority to make all such nominations, but
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sioner could only be confirmed if a Democratic commissioner was as well.
(Re-nominations were routinely held up to allow this type of horse trading
to occur.) Conceivably, this produced more partisan individuals-and led to
more dissent.45
Inferential statistics support this theory. The following table reports
the conditional probabilities of different commissioner vote choices, based
on a multinomial logit choice model that uses a dummy variable that distin-
guishes between the pre-1997 and the post-1997 period.
Chair Actions
Chair Chair
Affirms/Same Affr-ms/Different Partisan
Party as Party as Gap
Commissioner Commissioner
Pre-1997 RBOC
Affirm 94.60% 90.60% 4.00%
Dissent 0.80% 1.90% 1.10%
Commissioner Votes Post-1997 RBOC
Affirm 93.00% 85.70% 7.30%
_Dissent 1.60% 3.902.30%
Table 5. Inference from Multinomial Logit Results. No Chair and no Commission Dummies
(RBOCs, Partial Results)"
As is clear from the last column, the partisan gap for both affirm and
dissent is significantly greater in the post-1997 period. In other words, if a
commissioner belongs to a different party from the chair, he or she is much
less likely to affirm and more likely to dissent in the post-1997 period than
in the pre-1997 period.
longstanding tradition has given the basic responsibility for nominating candidates for scats reserved for
the party not in the White House to that party's Senate leader. Thus, when Bill Clinton was president,
Republican Leader Lott was the point man. The nominations did not simply reflect his personal prefe-
rences; he would listen to committee leaders, party officials, interest groups and others before making
his preferences known.").
45 These results are consistent with, and to a degree, conflict with recent findings. See Devins &
Lewis, supra note 6, at 481-86. Devins & Lewis find increasing party polarization over the 1990s. Id. at
498. They see it as a product of batching and a legacy of the presidency of Ronald Reagan. Id Our data
support the first claim, but not the second, as Reagan's move to reduce the size of the FCC, a change
motivated by partisanship, ironically led to a period of less partisanship. See MAZZOCCO, supra note 7,
at 162 (attributing the decrease in the number of commissioners to "political squabbling between the
Reagan administration and the Senate").
46 This table draws from Tables 5 and 7 in the Appendix.
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Table 6 shows the difference in conditional probabilities in affirming
between the seven-member (pre-1983) and five-member (post-1983) Com-
mission.
Chair Actions
Chair Chair
Affirms/Same Affirms/Different
Party as Party as Partisan
Commissioner Commissioner Gap
5 commissioners
Affirm
92.30% 85.70% 6.60%
Dissent 1.20% 2.90% 1.70%
Commissioner Votes 7 commissioners
Affirm 82.40% 71.20% 11.20%
Dissent 2.30% 5.20% 2.90%
Table 6. Inference from Multinomial Logit Results. No Chair and no Commissioner Dum-
mies (RBOCs)
Again, the partisan gaps for seven commissioners for both affirm and
dissent are greater in the larger commissions. If administrative dis-
sents/concurrences serve a signaling function, the significance of size can
be explained in terms of the dynamics of coalition-building. A larger Com-
mission allows the alliances to send more powerful signals. Also, in an at-
mosphere in which coalition-forming is prized and commissioners hesitate
making a lone stand, a larger Commission makes dissenting in numbers not
only more possible but more desirable. In this regard, our results are similar
to research showing that larger juries have a greater tendency to hang. 7
IV. OUR FINDINGS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY
Legal scholars have spilled much ink on the questions of whether and
how the president controls independent agencies. Some argue that a unitary
executive is required to place the bureaucracy under the president's direct
command and control. By granting "the executive power" exclusively to the
president, the Constitution forecloses Congress from creating "indepen-
dent" executive entities.48 Others argue that there are functions that Con-
gress may legitimately vest in an entity not directly answerable to the presi-
47 Michael J. Saks & Mollie Wcighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size, 21 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 451,459 (1997).
48 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 581-82.
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dent, even though the Constitution has some executive functions that Con-
gress may not limit, like defense and foreign affairs.49 For instance, Profes-
sors Larry Lessig and Cass Sunstein point to the Opinions Clause," which
empowers the president to require written reports from the heads of "de-
partments," as well as the Appointments Clause,5' which enables Congress
to vest heads of department with authority to appoint inferior officers. 2 In
light of these limitations, they argue that the Vesting Clause does not cloak
the president with an inherent power to control administration completely. 3
Similarly, Professor Robert Percival looks to the Necessary and Proper
Clause54 which provides Congress with the authority to enact laws "neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."55 He interprets this clause
as a power grant to Congress to specify how administrative authority is
exercised.56
Regardless of how one parses the constitutional text, divines the origi-
nal understanding, or slices and dices the three arms of government, the
entire debate inevitably involves empirical claims. Anti-unitarian advo-
cates, those who interpret the Constitution as permitting independent agen-
cies, generally find independent agencies as having positive value in gover-
nance;57 unitarians, those who interpret the Constitution as forbidding such
agencies, generally view them less positively. 8 The following briefly lists
four important empirical claims found most prominently in (or implicit in)
the scholarly literature about independent agencies and presidential and
congressional control:
(1) The justification for independent agencies-that they are free from
political pressure so as to follow "professional" or "objective ends" in a
focused manner-has been derided as wishful thinking.59
(2) Independent agencies reduce executive "energy" because they "can
pose a particularly stark challenge to the aspiration of presidents to control
administration."'
49 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 32-36.
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
51 ld. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
52 Lcssig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 32-36.
53 Id.
54 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
55 Id.
56 Percival, supra note 10, at 968.
57 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 106-08.
58 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 581-85.
59 Calabresi, supra note 8, at 83-84 ("[Tlhere are no 'independent' government actors in Washing-
ton, D.C. There are only actors influenced by [politics] .... " (footnote omitted)); Miller, supra note 9,
at 79-83.
[VOL. 17:3
HeinOnline -- 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 808 2009-2010
2010] PARTISANS & PARTISAN COMMISSIONS
(3) Independent agencies are particularly egregious in reducing ac-
countability because they magnify the interests of Congress above those of
the president in violation of constitutional structure. A "unitary executive
was said to be necessary to enable the president to defend himself from
constitutional encroachments on his powers by the legislature."6' This view
is shared by Antonin Scalia.62 Indeed, many see congressional hearings as a
form of congressional control.63 Even anti-unitarians argue that "[agency]
independence can be understood as a form of [congressional] aggrandize-
ment."'6 Therefore, congressional concerns, reflecting localized and region-
al agendas, dominate independent agencies.65
(4) Independent agencies decrease "accountability," taking decision-
making from the executive, who is accountable for enforcing the law. Both
unitarians and anti-unitarians share this view.66
60 Kagan, supra note 9, at 2274.
61 Calabresi, supra note 8, at 37.
62 Antonin Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, in YEARBOOK 1985, at 103, 110.
63 Calabresi, supra note 8, at 52 ("Between the formal and the informal aspects of the oversight
process alone, I think it is fair to say that the congressional committee structure plays a very significant
role in affecting how any given cabinet department or agency will use its law enforcement discretion.
... [lI]t raises the likelihood that those other two pretenders to the law execution function will carry out
their duties with state and local political preferences as their main concern, when the true claimant to the
executive throne would not do so. Put another way, one might fairly suspect that the paradigm case of
congressionally driven law execution would look something like Senator Sam Nunn setting national
defense policy on gays in the military with an eye to the social policy preferences of his State of Georgia
electoral base."). Indeed, some have claimed that congressional committees dominate the functioning of
the FCC and point to particular anecdotal instances to buttress the claims.
"Congress is quite jealous of its hegemony over the independent agencies, and can be ex-
pected to react strongly to any executive poaching." . . . Congress's view of its preroga-
tives is usually not completely lost on agency commissioners. Thus, it is not surprising
that when Deborah Tate recently appeared before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation for her confirmation hearing as an FCC Commissioner and
pledged 'to work closely with Congress[,]' [s]he said nothing about working closely with
the President.
Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN.
L. REV. 429, 449 (2006) (quoting Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43
ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 350 (1991); Nominations of Deborah Taylor Tate and Michael J. Copps to be
Commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com-
merce, Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Deborah Tate, Nominee, FCC)) (footnotes
omitted). One can, however, quite easily find instances of FCC chairs thumbing their noses at Congress.
For instance, Chairman Kevin Martin has pointedly and conspicuously ignored congressional calls to
halt his media ownership deregulation plan. Brooks Boliek, Lawmakers Push Delay on Ownership Vote,
HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 9,2007.
64 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 115.
65 Easterbrook, supra note I1, at 318-19 (contending that members of Congress and independent
agencies-which are more beholden to committee and subcommittee chairmen-are both "farther from
the median of national opinion than are presidents").
66 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 546; Kagan, supra note 9, at 2274, 2383-84 (arguing that
an increased presidential role in regulation "both satisfies legal requirements and promotes the values of
administrative accountability and effectiveness").
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We discuss these claims in order and how our findings support or
question them.
A. Claim: Independent Agencies Are (or Are Not) Free from Political
Pressure Allowing them to Follow "Professional" or "Objective"
Goals
Our data do not address this issue head-on. Indeed, such a question de-
fies empirical inquiry simply because of the difficulty of coding for profes-
sional or objective goals: how does one determine objectively whether a
given FCC order professionally advances the objective public good or re-
flects a crass political accommodation? From a certain perspective, our data
are consistent with the professional vision of the bureaucracy. After all,
most decisions are by consensus, and dissent is not party-driven. Such a
world is consistent with one guided by clear professional goals-and differ-
ing views based upon honest disagreement, not partisan pressure.
Yet, claims about politicization of independent agencies need to be
clarified. The scholarly literature underappreciates that independent agen-
cies need not necessarily be independent. If a president appointed a chair
and at least two commissioners beholden to him, a very un-independent
chair could ram through anything the president wanted on a 3-2 basis.
Strong presidential control would result in highly partisan commissions.67
While the president cannot fire a commissioner, he can remove him as
chair, which is a significant sanction.
Independence is a choice; depending on one's view of human motiva-
tion, either the chair makes this choice or those appointing the chair do.
Thus, our data show that independence and the degree to which that inde-
pendence functions as proxy for "professionalism" (and party affiliated
voting and the degree to which partisanship functions as a proxy for con-
gressional or presidential control) do not emerge necessarily from agency
structure. At most, agency structure is a necessary, but not sufficient, cause
for independence.
Beyond that, our results question an assumption concerning the rela-
tionship between independence and partisanship. Implicit in the argument
that partisan agencies promote independence is the assumption that com-
missioners from different parties would allow for differing perspectives to
inform policy. The right "professional" answer would emerge from an ideo-
logical compromise resulting from the commission's partisan composi-
tion-the shared area in a Venn diagram of a Democratic circle overlapping
a Republican circle.
67 We agree with those who claim that increasing partisanship increased presidential control. See
Devins & Lewis, supra note 6, at 469-71.
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Our results do not support such a vision of independent agencies.
When there is dissent from the consensus, the dissent does not seem partic-
ularly related to party. Rather, commissioners of either party seem to dis-
sent for reasons other than party affiliation. Independence is a quality that
does not appear particularly partisan.
B. Claim: Independent Agencies Reduce Executive "Energy" Because
they Can Pose a Particularly Stark Challenge to the Aspiration of
Presidents to Control Administration
It is not clear why independent agencies sap presidential power. As
mentioned above, the chair does serve as chair at the president's pleasure,
and the president does nominate all commissioners. After all, if the presi-
dent can appoint sufficiently partisan commissioners-or if parties function
as sufficiently disciplining entities over all branches of government-
everything can be rammed through on a partisan basis. Indeed, the regres-
sions show that partisanship does drive decisionmaking.
Yet, even with increasing partisanship in recent years, compromise
remains the rule, and, when dissent occurs, non-partisanship drives such
dissent. This suggests that the FCC agenda must be made palatable not only
to the majority party, but to the minority party as well. Further, different
commissioners have significantly different tolerances for dissent: some are
conciliatory while others are less so.
Our data, therefore, support the notion that the FCC saps presidential
power and provides an explanatory mechanism. Some chairs value consen-
sus and clearly consensus must be bought at a price. In this sense, the chair
has mixed loyalties-not just to his or her president or congressional spon-
sors but also to "go along and get along," (i.e., to garner favors from either
other commissioners or special interests). A similar analysis applies to
commissioners' tendency to dissent. At the same time, the non-partisan
drivers for dissent also indicate that commissioners are not following the
party line. If party-line voting can be understood as proxy presidential con-
trol, then independent agencies do seem to resist at times this control.
C. Claim: Independent Agencies are a Form of Congressional Control
Just as it is likely that party affiliation serves as a proxy for presiden-
tial control, it is also likely to serve as a proxy for congressional control.
The unitary executive debate sees independent agencies as tools both of
Congress as an institution and of particular factions within it (i.e., commit-
2010]
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tee chairs, geographical blocks, etc.).68 We find that while partisanship is a
driver, it is not always the most significant driver. Commissioners do not
function in party lockstep. Therefore, Congress, as a party-run institution,
cannot be said to control the FCC.
If congressional control means that commissioners are beholden to
particular congressional sponsors or allies, then the data may offer some
support. Given that Congress's votes are not as rigidly party-driven as many
would expect,69 it seems likely that commissioners, currying favor with
particular congressman, would not make party-driven decisions. Further,
not all congresspersons are lock-stop partisans, and commissioners could
mirror the variety of partisanships found among congressmen and women.
D. Claim: Independent Agencies Decrease "Accountability, "Meaning
that They Take Decisionmaking from the Hands of Those who are De-
mocratically Chosen
Because the president, who alone faces a national electorate, cannot
exercise complete control over independent agencies, their performance is
not accountable to the national electorate, thus frustrating democratic over-
sight of government. Our data support this. We find non-partisan concerns
driving commissioner behavior. To the degree party-affiliated voting can be
seen as reflecting presidential or congressional control, our results find a
surprising lack of such control, or at least a large amount of variability of
such control.
68 See Calabresi, supra note 8, at 82-83 ("Not only does such an arrangement discourage energy
and accountability, it also creates the risk of factional domination of the administration of the govern-
ment through the congressional committee system."); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 583 ("Such
indirect political control will necessarily exist with any so-called 'independent' agency or officer be-
cause absent presidential control, congressional oversight and appropriations powers become the only
concern for the officers of the allegedly 'independent' agencies."); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at
115 ("[Agency] independence can be understood as a form of [congressional] aggrandizement. Congress
might make agencies independent not to create real independence, but in order to diminish presidential
authority over their operations precisely in the interest of subjecting those agencies to the control of
congressional committees. Independence, in short, might be a way of increasing legislative power over
agencies." (footnote omitted)); May, supra note 63, at 448 ("As Justice Scalia suggested, many general-
ly assume that Congress, by virtue of various means at hand, exerts more policy control over the inde-
pendent agencies than the President. The vehicles for congressional influence include control over
appropriations, appropriation riders directing or restricting specific agency actions, oversight hearings
and investigations, mechanisms for congressional review of regulations, enactment of legislation over-
turning or modifying agency actions-or just the threat to employ any of these devices." (footnote
omitted)).
69 See generally Steven D. Levitt, How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Prefe-
rences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 425, 425-27 (1996).
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CONCLUSION
This essay has several, related empirical findings. First, while party af-
filiation does drive decisionmaking to some degree, non-partisan concerns
often dominate. Second, to the degree party affiliation drives voting, its
effect varies significantly among chairs and commissioners. Third, to the
degree partisan voting can serve as a proxy for presidential or congressional
control, this control varies. Fourth, this variation among chairs and com-
missioners can often be greater than the variation between members of dif-
ferent parties. Finally, this variation seems sensitive to the method of com-
missioner selection and their decisionmaking environment.
These findings change our understandings of the debates concerning
the constitutionality and desirability of independent agencies. Partisanship
does not exercise a lock-step control over partisan agencies. Rather, parti-
sanship can turn more on which individuals are chosen to be commissioners
or chairs and their working environment.
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APPENDIX
Mean Standard Min. Max.
Deviation
Number of Commissioners 5.35 1.21 3 8
RBOC 0.06 - 0 1
Majority Party Chair Affirm 0.48 - 0 1
Majority Party Chair Concur 0.005 - 0 1
Majority Party Chair Partial 0.001 - 0 1
Dissent
Minority Party Chair Dissent 0.002 - 0 1
Minority Party Chair Affirm 0.49 - 0 1
Minority Party Chair Concur 0.005 - 0 1
Minority Party Chair Partial 9E-04 - 0 1
Dissent
Minority Party Chair Dissent 0.002 - 0 1
Observations 32,515
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
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Choices
Ind. Majority Affirm Concur Partial Dissent
Variables Party DissentChair **
Affirm 
.82 0.03 1.70" 
-0.24
ChairConcur -. 51 1.00 2.73 -0.21
Chair
Partial 19.8 22.28
_Dissent
ChairChis 0.03 0.57 2.91Dissent
RBOC -0.28 .39* .90*** 0.25
___CoI__n_'rs -. 79 -. 35 -. 77 .41
Ohs. 32,5151
Choices
hId. Minority PartialAffirm Concur Dissent
Variables Party Dissent
Chair *Cair 0.17 
-0.23 2.01 0.05
Chair
-Cr 0.06 1.35 2.99 0.46Concur
Chair
Partial -0.86 4.19"** -0.38
_Dissent
Chair *Chis 0.09 
-0.63 2.83 0.01Dissent
RBOC -0.28 .39* .90* 0.25
# Con-n'rs -. 79 -. 35 -. 77 .41
Ohs.
Table 2. Determinants of Commissioner Choice. Multinomial Logit ( significant at 10%;
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%); "majority party" refers to commissioner votes
made when the chair belongs to the same party as the commissioner; "minority party" refers
to votes made when the chair belongs to the opposing party (i.e., majority party votes are
made when the commissioner and chair are both Republicans or Democrats; minority party
votes are when the commissioner is Democrat and the chair Republican or vice versa)
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Choices
Ind. Majority Affirm Concur Partial Dissent
Variables Party Dissent
Chair**Affirm 
.65 
-0.05 1.45 
-0.34
Chair
Concr 
-0.32 1.08"** 2.95 
-0.08Concur
Chair
Partial 20.9***
Dissent
Chair -0.06 0.56 2.98
Dissent
RBOC -. 67*** 0.02 0.03 -0.41
#Comm'rs -. 33 0.02 -. 37 -0.11
Ots. 32,5151
Choices
Ind. Minority Affirm Concur Partial Dissent
Variables Party Dissent
ChairCair-0.01 
-0.35 1.77" 
-0.07Affirm
Concr 0.15 1.44 3.21 0.6Concur
Chair
Partial -0.93 -38.2*** 4.24 -0.34
_Dissent
ChairChis 0.17 
-0.56 3.38** 0.14Dissent
RBOC -. 67*** 0.02 0.03 -0.41
# Cofmm'rs -. 33 0.02 -. 37*** -0.11
O1s. 32,515 1
Table 3. Determinants of Commissioner Choice. Multinomial Logit with Chair Dummies
(* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%); "majority party" refers to
commissioner votes made when the chair belongs to the same party as the commissioner;
"minority party" refers to votes made when the chair belongs to the opposing party (i.e., ma-
jority party votes are made when the commissioner and chair are both Republicans or Demo-
crats; minority party votes are when the commissioner is Democrat and the chair Republican
or vice versa)
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Choices
Ind. Majority Partial
Variables Party Affirm Concur Dissent DissentChair
Affirm 
.67 0.08 1.67 
-0.13CAir
Chair -. 56* 1.33 2.89"** -0.17
Concur
Chair
Partial 33.36 34.15
_Dissent
ChairChDis 
-0.18 0.5 3.15Dissent
RBOC -. 56*** 0.2 0.22 -0.23
# Conm'rs -. 74 -0.49 -. 82 -. 68
Obs. 32,5151
Choices
Ind Minority Affirm Concur Partial
Variables Party Affirm Concur Dissent Dissent
ChairCair 0.3 
-0.21 1.87 0.12JAirn
Chair***
-Cr 0.1 .99 2.83 0.2Concur
Chair
Partial -0.99 4.14"** -0.44
,Dissent
Chair
Dissent 1.50 0.8 4.49 1.43
RBOC -. 56*** 0.2 0.22 -0.23
# Comn'rs -. 74*** -0.49 -. 82*** -. 68
Ohs. 32,5151
Table 4. Determinants of Commissioner Choice. Multinomial Logit with Commissioner
Dummies (" significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%); "majority party"
refers to commissioner votes made when the chair belongs to the same party as the commis-
sioner; "minority party" refers to votes made when the chair belongs to the opposing party
(i.e., majority party votes are made when the commissioner and chair are both Republicans
or Democrats; minority party votes are when the commissioner is Democrat and the chair
Republican or vice versa)
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Majority Majority Minority Minority Minority. MinorityCommissione Majority Party Party Chair Party Chair Party Chair Party ChaiParty Chair
Votes Chair Aflirm Concurs Dissents Affim Concurs Dissents Dissents
in Part
No RBOC 5 commissioners
Affn'm 95.80%/o 75.80% 66.60% 92.10%A 78.00%/ 63.70%/ 90.60%
Concur 1.70% 13.70% 4.60% 2.50% 12.80%/ 6.00% 1.80%
Dissent Part 0.50% 4.60% 0.20% 1.40% 3.90%/ 23.70% 3.30%
Dissent 0.70/ 2.30% 26.80% 1.80% 3.000/ 2.30% 1.90%
Not
Participate 1.20% 3.60% 1.800/0 2.20% 2.40% 4.30%/ 2.40%/
RBOC 5 commissioners
Affirm 92.30/ 60.00% 53.70% 85.70% 63.00% 39.30% 81.40%
Concur 3,30% 21.20% 7.20% 4.50/ 20.10% 7.30% 3.10°A
Dissent Part 1.70% 11.900/0 0.40/ 4.20/ 10.30/ 47.50/ 9.800/
Dissent 1.20%1 3.100/o 36.70/ 2.90/ 4.10% 2.40% 2.900/
Not
Participate 1.50%6 3.80/ 2.00% 2.70/ 2.50% 3.500/ 2.800/
Table 5. Inference from Multinomial Logit Results. No Chair and no Commissioner Dum-
mies; "majority party" refers to commissioner votes made when the chair belongs to the
same party as the commissioner; "minority party" refers to votes made when the chair be-
longs to the opposing party (i.e., majority party votes are made when the commissioner and
chair are both Republicans or Democrats; minority party votes are when the commissioner is
Democrat and the chair Republican or vice versa)
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Commissioner Majority Majority Majority Minority Minority Minority Minority
Votes Party Chair Party Chair Party Chair Party Chair Party Chai Party Chair Party Chai
Affirms Concurs Dissents Affirms Concurs Dissents Dissents
in Part
Hundt RBOC
Affirm 94.10% 72.50/ 74.70/ 90.000/0 75.40/ 63.50% 89.600/
Concur 3.00/o 19.20/, 9.20% 4.200/ 18.00% 10.400/ 2.800/
Dissent Part
0.30% 3.000/ 0.100/ 0.80% 2.50/ 17.70% 3.40%
Dissent 0.30% 0.70/ 12.200/ 0.70/ 0.90/ 0.90%1 0.70%
Absent 2.30% 4.70/ 3.800/ 4.300/ 3.100/ 7.600/ 3.500/
Hundt No RBOC
Affirm 96.80% 83.70/a 82.40/ 94.40/ 85.60% 77.30/ 94.200/
Concur 1.60/ 11.100/0 5.10/s 2.20/a 10.30/ 6.30/a 1.500/
Dissent Part
0.20% 1.70/0 0.100/0 0.40/ 1.40/ 10.60/a 1.800/
Dissent 0.200/ 0.60/ 10.30/a 0.500/ 0.800/0 0.800/A 0.50%
Absent 1.300/ 2.90% 2.200 2.400/ 1.90/ 4.900/ 2.000/
Powell RBOC
Affirm 92.80/ 63.40/ 45.70/ 86.60/ 65.700 37.60/ 78.200/
Concur 3.40% 18.900/0 6.300/ 4.50/ 17.70/ 6.90/ 2.700/
Dissent Part
1.60% 12.80/ 0.40/ 3.90/ 10.900/0 51.20/ 14.700/
Dissent 1.700/ 4.00/ 47.10/ 4.00/ 5.10/ 3.4004 3.700
Absent 0.50% 0.900/0 0.50/ 0.900/0 0.600 0.900/ 0.70%
Powel No RBOC
Affirm 95.800 76.700 53.600 91.800% 78.100% 54.200 86.900/
Concur 1.8004 11.500 3.700 2.400 10.600 5.0004 1.5004
Dissent Part
0.80% 7.60 0.200 2.100 6.304 36.300 8.000/
Dissent 1.30% 3.700 42.2004 3.300/ 4.604 3.7004 3.100/
Absent 0.30% 0.600 0.30/0 0.50%1 0.400 0.7004 0.400
Table 6. Inference from Multinomial Logit Results. Chair Dummies; "majority party" refers
to commissioner votes made when the chair belongs to the same party as the commissioner;
"minority party" refers to votes made when the chair belongs to the opposing party (i.e., ma-
jority party votes are made when the commissioner and chair are both Republicans or Demo-
crats; minority party votes are when the commissioner is Democrat and the chair Republican
or vice versa)
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Majority Majority Majority Minority Minoity Minority MinorityComrnissioner PartyChair PartyChair PartyChair PartyChair PartyChah Party Caif Party Chair
Votes Affirns Co D Affirms Concurs Dissents Dissentsin Part
Barrett No RBOC
Affirm 97.50/0 79.10% 75.20/ 96.80A 88.60% 90.30/ 95.70/
Concur 1.80/ 17.100/ 4.90/ 1.900/A 8.50/o 7.60% 1.60%
Dissent Part 0.300/ 2.40/0 0.100/a 0.40A 1.60% 0.20% 1.80/6
Dissent 0.4 00/A 1.109/ 19.70/6A 0.80o 1.10/6 1.50% 0.80%
Absent 0.100/0 0.30/a 0.20/o 0.100/ 0.200/ 0.40% 0.000/
Duggan No RBOC
Affirm 97.60% 79.90a 84.10% 97.00% 89.20% 90.40/ 96.20/
Concur 1.70% 16.30/ 5.10% 1.800/ 8.10% 7.20% 1.50/
Dissent Part
0.30% 2.40°% 0.100/0 0.40/a 1.60% 0.20% 1.80/a
Dissent 0.20% 0.50/o 10.000/ 0.30% 0.500/ 0.70% 0.40/
Absent 0.30% 0.900/ 0.70/6 0.50/ 0.60% 1.60/ 0.10/
Furchtgott-Roth No RBOC 
I
Affirm 88.40/ 46.00% 26.50% 82.70% 59.80/ 22.20/ 66.80/
Concur 3.20% 20.00% 3.40% 3.20% 1 1.60/ 3.80a 2.20/
Dissent Part
4.50/o 27.30/, 0.60% 7.40% 20.700/ 70.20/ 25.10A
Dissent 3.700 6.30/ 69.30% 6.40% 7.50/ 3.60a 5.90%
Absent 0.200/ 0.40% 0.20% 0.30/ 0.30/ 0.30% 0.100/a
Hooks No RBOC
Affirm 79.00/ 29.80% 16.10/ 73.20/ 45.20/ 28.90a 68.30a
Concur 11.80% 53.20% 8.60/ 11.70/ 35.90% 20.10a 9.20/A
Dissent Part
1.80% 7.70% 0.20/. 2.80/. 6.80/. 39.80/ 11.20a
Dissent 5.800/6 7.20/a 74.40% 10.00/ 10.104o 8.20/A 10.60/oa
Absent 1.7006 2.100/ 0.80/0 2.20/0 2.00O0 3.0006 0.60
Table 7. Inference from Multinomial Logit Results. Commissioner Dummies; "majority par-
ty" refers to commissioner votes made when the chair belongs to the same party as the com-
missioner; "minority party" refers to votes made when the chair belongs to the opposing par-
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Same Party Same Party Same Party Different Different Different DifferentCommissioner Chair Chair Chair Party Chai Party Chair a Party Chair
Votes Affirms Concurs Dissents Affirms] Concurs Dissent Dissents
in Part
Pre-1997 RBOC
A fiFrn 94.60% 65.10/o 61.800 90.60/. 66.80/o 59.000% 88.80%
Concur 4.10% 27.50% 10.00O/ 5.80O 25.80% 13.60% 4.00O
Dissent Part 0.60% 5.30% 0.20°% 1.70%/ 4.70% 25.20/o 5.10%/
Dissent 0.80% 2.10% 28.00%, 1.900/A 2.70/6 2.20% 2.00%
Post-1997 RBOC
Affirm 93.00% 58.60% 47.20%o 85.70A 60.60/o 33.000/6 75.50A
Concur 2.80% 17.30/ 5.30A 3.80/ 16.30/a 5.30% 2.40%
Dissent Part 2.60% 19.900/a 0.60o 6.60/a 17.70/a 59.00% 18.30A
Dissent 1.600/ 4.100/a 46.80°/A 3.90/o 5.40/ 2.70/o 3.80A
Pre-1997 No RBOC
Affirm 97.20% 79.50%/ 71.00°% 94.90/ 80.50% 75.00/o 93.90%
Concur 1.900/0 15.60O 5.30a 2.80/0 14.40% 8.000/0 2.00A
Dissent Part 0.30% 3.00% 0.100/A 0.800/ 2.60% 15.00/0 2.50A
Dissent 0.60% 1 1.900/A 23.60A 1.50/ 2.400/6 2.00/1 1.60/:
Post-1997 No RBOC
Affirm 96.20% 74.20A 56.00A 91.70/0 75.40% 50.80% 85.90A
Concur 1.30/, 10.10°/ 2.90A 1.900/0 9.40/o 3.80% 1.30%
Dissent Part 1.20/o 11.80%A 0.40% 3.30/s 10.30/a 42.40/a 9.70%
Dissent 1.20% 3.80o 40.70A 3.10/1 4.90/1 3.00% 3.20%
Table 8. Inference from Multinomial Logit Results. No Chair and no Commission Dummies;
"majority party" refers to commissioner votes made when the chair belongs to the same party
as the commissioner; "minority party" refers to votes made when the chair belongs to the op-
posing party
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Same Party Same Party Same Party Different Different Different Different
Commissioner Chair Chair Chair Party Chair Party Chair Party Chair Party ChairVotes Affirms Concurs Dissents Affirms Concurs Dissents Dissents
in Part
No RBOC 5 corrnissioners
Affirm 95.80% 75.80% 66.60/ 92.10% 78.00% 63.70% 90.60%
Concur 1.70/o 13.70% 4.60/v 2.50%/ 12.80/ 6.00/ 1.80/
Dissent Part 0.50% 4.60/o 0.20% 1.40% 3.90% 23.70% 3.30%
Dissent 0.70% 2.30/o 26.80/ 1.800/0 3.00% 2.30/a 1.900/
Not Participate
1.20/ 3.60% 1.80/a 2.20% 2.40% 4.30/ 2.40%
RBOC 5 commissioners
Affirm 92.30% 60.00% 53.70% 85.70% 63.00% 39.30/ 81.40%
Concur 3.30% 21.20/v 7.20% 4.50% 20.10/ 7.30% 3.100/
Dissent Part 1.70/v 11.90 0/ 0.40% 4.20% 10.30/ 47.50%/ 9.800/c
Dissent 1.200/ 3. 10% 36.70/ 2.90% 4.10% 2.40/ 2.90/
Not Participate
1.50/o 3.80/v 2.00% 2.70% 2.50/a 3.50/v 2.80/
No RBOC 7 commissioners
Affirm 88.70% 55.70/o 46.20/ 80.70% 59.70/ 49.50% 79.600/
Concur 3.90% 24.30/ 7.60% 5.20% 23.60/ 11.30% 3.700/
Dissent Part 0.50/ 3.50/s 0.100/ 1.30% 3.10A 19.20/a 3.100/c
Dissent 1.50/a 3.60/ 39.80/ 3.500/ 4.90/ 3.90/ 3.600/
Not Participate
5.40/v 12.80/ 6.20/ 9.40% 8.80/ 16.20/ 10.100/c
RBOC 7 commissioners
Affirm 82.40/ 40.40/v 33.70/ 71.20/ 44.00/ 30.60/ 68.500/c
Concur 7.00/ 34.50/ 10.900/ 9.000 33.90/ 13.60/ 6.300/c
Dissent Part 1.60%/a 8.30% 0.30% 3.60% 7.50/ 38.50/ 8.600/
Dissent 2.30/a 4.50/6 49.20/ 5.20/ 6.10/a 4.l10/ 5.200/c
Not Participate
6.600/v 12.30/o 6.000/ 11.000/ 8.500/ 13.200/A 11.400/
Table 9. Inference from Multinomial Logit Results. No Chair and no Commissioner Dum-
mies; "majority party" and "minority party" have the same meaning as in Table 8
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